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PART II 
Public Law 
CHAPTER 11 
Constitutional Law 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
§ll.l. Commission on constitutional revision. The Constitution 
of Massachusetts, adopted in 1780, is the oldest written organic law 
extant. Over the years, however, it has been amended some 89 times, 
and some of the amendments have been themselves amendments, or 
even re-amendments, of earlier amendments. In consquence, the reader 
must wade through a tangled mass of verbiage before he is able to 
determine what is the presently operative language of the instrument. 
The Constitutional Convention of 1917 undertook a rearrangement of 
the Constitution, and its recommendation was accepted by popular 
vote, but an advisory opinionl and a decision2 of the Supreme Judicial 
Court rendered the rearrangement nugatory. 
In addition to being a cumbersome document, the Constitution 
contains a number of obsolete provisions, is cast, in part, in unneces-
sarily archaic language, has at least one probably unconstitutional 
section,3 and spouts anachronistic rhetoric.4 
In 1962, the legislature established a special Commission to make 
an investigation and study relative to the need for amendment, 
revision, or simplification of the Constitution.5 The Commission was 
composed of three senators, five representatives, and eight persons 
appointed by the Governor. The Commission members were unpaid, 
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a 
member of the Bars of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
§11.1. lOpinion of the Justices, 233 Mass. 603, 125 N.E. 849 (1920). 
2 Loring v. Young, 239 Mass. 349, 132 N.E. 65 (1921). 
3 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. IV: "The people ... shall exercise 
and enjoy every power, jurisdiction and right which is not, or may not hereafter, 
be by them expressly delegated to the United States ... " (emphasis supplied). See 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U.S. 1819). 
4 These matters are catalogued in Shanley, The Problem of Simplifying the Mas-
sachusetts Constitution (Bureau of Government Research, University of Massachu-
setts, 1966). 
1\ aesolves of 1962, c. 88. 
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and there was an appropriation of $10,000 to cover Commission ex-
penses for the five years of its existence. 
Under the practice which has developed in such mixed commissions, 
the chairmanship was taken by the senior senator. The Commission 
held several meetings, and it listened to presentations of views on 
several pending constitutional amendments. It retained as counsel an 
attorney well versed in state government and constitutional law, but 
he was able to serve only on a limited, part-time basis. Counsel gave 
the Commission a measure of direction by apportioning among the 
active members (the legislator-members for the most part attended the 
meetings only sporadically) areas of individual research into cur-
rently proposed constitutional amendments, while he prepared a 
foundation for an overall revision or simplification by revising and 
updating, with the cooperation of Samuel Eliot Morison, the history 
of the Constitution which the latter had prepared for the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1917. 
In March, 1963, the Commission issued its initial report, which 
consisted mainly of monographs, euphemistically designated subcom-
mittee reports, prepared by Commission members on the subjects of 
pending proposed amendments, and an appendix, the revised and 
updated history of the Constitution. The legislature did not order the 
report printed, and its only publication was a limited mimeographed 
edition, issued by the Commission. 
The original chairman failed of re-election to the Senate in No-
vember, 1962, and he retired from the Commission. In accordance with 
protocol, he was succeeded by the senior senator. During 1963 and 
1964 a few desultory meetings of the Commission were held, but the 
only tangible outgrowth of the Commission's existence was a poll, 
taken by mail, indicating approval or disapproval by Commission 
members of proposed constitutional amendments passed by joint 
sessions of the legislature and subject to popular referendum in the 
election of November, 1964. The results of the poll were published by 
the Secretary of the Commonwealth as a part of his pamphlet of 
information to voters.6 
The Commission met in November, and again in December, 1965. 
The members present (less than a quorum) tentatively drafted pro-
posed amendments looking to accommodation of the right of free 
petition to the promotion of legislative efficiency. Looking, however, 
to the overall problem of constitutional revision or simplification, the 
members concluded that as structured by its enabling legislation, the 
Commission did not have adequate resources for the detailed research 
and drafting necessarily entailed in a project of revision or simplifica-
tion. Suggested recruitment of volunteer researchers has not materi-
alized, and the Commission did not meet in 1966. The Commission is 
scheduled to go out of existence on March 22, 1967. 
While the Commission has not made, and likely will not make 
6 As authorized by Mass. Const., Part IV, Amend. Art. XLVIII, as amended by 
Amend. Art. LXXIV, §4. 
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significant progress towards the attainment of its statutory goal, its 
experience may well serve to focus sympathetic attention upon pro-
posals for continuing constitutional revision commissions.7 It would 
doubtless be the better part of wisdom to have such a Commission 
broadly based, as is the present Commission, which contains legis-
lators, persons who have been elected to executive office, and private 
citizens. It would also probably be desirable for members to serve 
without compensation, as do the the present members. But it is highly 
important that the Commission be adequately financed, so that it can 
have the assistance of a competent, permanent, full-time director, with 
a sufficient research and secretarial staff. A Commission so constructed 
would be in excellent position to advise the legislature or constitu-
tional convention in their dealings with constitutional amendment or 
revision, and to inform the electorate in referenda upon such matters. 
§ 11.2. Obscenity: Retroactive application of constitutional doctrine. 
A year ago the Supreme Judicial Court held 1 that the book, Memoirs 
of a Women of Pleasure, by John Cleland (popularly known by its 
subtitle, "Adventures of Fanny Hill"), was obscene within the meaning 
of the statute2 which is held to cover "all material that is obscene in 
the constitutional sense."3 All of the justices agreed that the book fell 
within the so-called Roth4 criterion in that (a) the dominant theme of 
the material taken as whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex, and 
(b) it is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary com-
munity standards relating to the description or representation of 
sexual matters. The Court, however, divided over the issue whether 
the book had "redeeming social importance." The majority refused to 
equate "minimal literary value" with the requisite "social importance." 
During the 1966 SURVEY year the Massachusetts decision was 
reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.5 There was no 
opinion of the Court. Instead, Justice Brennan wrote an opinion for 
himself, Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas. Justice Douglas 
wrote a concurring opinion, and Justices Black and Stewart concurred 
for reasons set forth in their dissenting opinions in companion cases.6 
The remaining three Justices dissented in three separate opinions. 
7 See, e.g. House No. 2267 (1965), discussed in Massachusetts Legislative Research 
Council, Report Relative to Constitutional Revision Procedures, Senate No. 845 
(1966). 
§11.2. 1 Attorney General v. A. Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a 
Woman of Pleasure," 349 Mass. 69, 206 N.E.2d 403 (1965). See 1965 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §11.6. 
2 G.L., c. 272, §§28C, 28E, 28F. 
3 Attorney General v. The Book Named "Tropic of Cancer," 345 Mass. 11, 13, 
184 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1962). See 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §1O.4. 
4 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498 (1957), 
expanded in Manual Enterprises, Inc., v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 82 Sup. Ct. 1432, 8 L. 
Ed. 2d 639, (1962) (opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan). 
5 "Memoirs" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1966). 
6 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 497, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 950, 956, 16 
L. Ed. 2d 31, 41, 53 (1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515, 518, 86 Sup. 
Ct. 958, 968, 969, 16 L. Ed. 2d 56, 66, 67 (1966). 
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Justice Brennan's opinion would base reversal on the ground that 
a court may not measure degrees of social value in determining 
whether a publication is constitutionally obscene. Borrowing from a 
generalization in his opinion of the Court in Roth,7 he wrote: "A book 
cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly without redeeming 
social value. This is so even though the book is found to possess the 
requisite prurient appeal and to be patently offensive."s Thus, he 
concluded, it was error to base condemnation of the book on the 
ground that it has some, but not enough, social value. Qustice Clark, 
in dissent,9 pointed out that the trial court specifically found that the 
book is utterly without redeeming social importance, and that its 
finding was not overturned on appeal. The point is of doubtful merit, 
since the statute10 provides for an in rem proceeding in equity against 
the book. It is settled equity practice that a trial judge's findings are 
subject to de novo appraisal on appeal,11 and it is quite irrelevant that 
the reviewing court failed, for the wrong reason, to exercise its 
powers of revision.) 
Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result, basically upon 
the ground that the Constitution will not tolerate any limitation upon 
publication, and Justice Stewart concurred on the ground that the 
book does not constitute "hard core pornography" (an undefined 
term) which alone, he said, can be suppressed. 
While "Fanny Hill" was pending in the Supreme Court, the Su-
preme Judicial Court heard argument in another obscenity case, a 
proceeding against "Naked Lunch," by William Burroughs. The book 
consists of an unrelieved flow of indecently vulgar language, repre-
senting the paranoid ravings of a narcotics addict. After argument, 
the case was held under advisement, in the expectation of "clarifi-
cation"12 of the applicable law by the United States Supreme Court. 
After the decision in "Fanny Hill" and the companion cases in the 
Supreme Court, a divided Supreme Judicial Court decided that 
"Naked Lunch" was not obscene.1s Assuming, without articulation of 
the point, that the prurient-interest-in-sex test was satisfied because 
the book "may appeal to the prurient interest of deviants and those 
curious about deviants,"14 and observing that it is "grossly offensive," 
the Court addressed itself to the question of redeeming social value. 
As to this, the majority, in a per curiam opinion said: 
7354 u.S. 476, 484, 77 Sup. Ct. 1304, 1309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1498, 1507 (1957). The 
language there was: "But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the 
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance." 
S 383 U.S. 413, 419, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 978, 16 L. Ed. 2d I, 6 (1966) (emphasis in 
original). 
9Id. at 443, 86 Sup. Ct. at 990, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 19·20. 
10 G.L., c. 272, §§28C, 28E, 28F. 
11 Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E. 2d 27 (1943). 
121966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1177, 1186, 218 N.E.2d 571, 576 (dissenting opinion). 
13 Attorney General v. A Book Named "Naked Lunch," 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1177, 
218 N.E.2d 571. 
14 Ibid. 
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... a substantial and intelligent group in the community believes 
the book to be of some literary signifiance. Although we are not 
bound by the opinions of others concerning the book, we cannot 
ignore the serious acceptance of it by so many persons in the 
literary community. Hence, we cannot say that "Naked Lunch" 
has no "redeeming social importance in the hands of those who 
publish or distribute it on the basis of that value." See the 
Memoirs case at p. 421. 
Justices Reardon and Kirk sharply disagreed. They argued that the 
matter of redeeming social importance was one of fact, to be deter-
mined by the court on the basis of evidence (presumably, including 
the book itself). Accordingly, the argument continued, the trier of 
fact may make his own evaluation of the testimony of even expert 
witnesses both in the light of other evidence and of the testimony of 
each other. 
This reasoning does not meet squarely what appears to be the point 
made by the majority. This is, that literary importance, or social value, 
is essentially a subjective thing, and the basic question of fact is, not 
whether the work has demonstrable artistic merit, but whether people 
whose opinions command respect, if not agreement, think it has such 
merit. Hopefully, the Supreme Court of the United States will, in 
time, supply guide lines to assist courts in fleshing the bones of the 
phrase, "redeeming social value." 
Justice Reardon disagreed with his brethren on another point. The 
Supreme Court, in a case decided along with the Fanny Hill case, 
ruled that there might be a fourth ingredient of legal obscenity. 
Presenting or advertising a book in a manner pandering to prurient 
interest may be considered on the issue of obscenity. In the language 
of the United States Supreme Court: 
Where an exploitation of interests in titillation by pornography 
is shown with respect to material lending itself to such exploi-
tation through pervasive treatment or description of sexual 
matters, such evidence may support the determination that the 
material is obscene even though in other contexts the material 
would escape such condemnation.111 
In Fanny Hill, the United States Supreme Court did not consider this 
ingredient of obscenity, because the record was silent concerning the 
manner of advertising and distributing the book. Mr. Justice Brennan, 
however, took occasion to state that the decision in the case would not 
necessarily preclude a finding of obscenity of the book if it should be 
shown that the book was "commercially exploited for the sake of 
prurient appeal, to the exclusion of all other values."16 
15 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475-476, 86 Sup. Ct. 942, 950, 16 L. 
Ed. 2d 31, 41 (1966). This doctrine was invoked as part of the ground for sus-
taining a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1465 (1964), in Books, Inc. v. United States, 
358 F.2d 935 (1st Cir. 1966). 
16383 U.S. 413, 420, 86 Sup. Ct. 975, 978, 16 L. Ed. 2d 1, 7 (1966). 
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In Naked Lunch, all of the participating justices (Chief Justice 
Wilkins did not sit) were agreed that the book might well be found 
obscene in the event of a showing that the book is advertised or dis-
tributed in a manner to exploit it for the sake of its possible prurient 
appeal. The majority, however, made the qualification that the 
exploitation must be shown to take place after March 21, 1966, the 
date of the United States Supreme Court's announcement of the 
fourth ingredient of obscenity. Justice Reardon would reject the 
qualification. He felt that, particularly since the case was actually 
pending when the Supreme Court decisions came down, evidence of 
promotional activity prior to the date of the decisions was just as 
relevant as evidence of activity subsequent to that date. 
This touches upon one of the most pressing issues current in the 
field of constitutional law. When a Court formulates a "new" rule of 
constitutional doctrine, to what extent is it "retroactive?" On the 
premise that the rule was always embedded in the Constitution and 
was simply "discovered" by the justices, logic would seem to dictate its 
applicability to past, as well as to future conduct. The premise of 
course, is debatable, and constitutional adjudication frequently 
involves more than logic. 
Courts have traditionally claimed power to rule, as a matter of 
policy, that a newly proclaimed doctrine will be applied prospectively 
only.17 The doctrine that an indigent defendant must be given equal 
access to a trial transcript for appeal purposes18 was given retro-
spective application,19 but the doctrine that a state conviction may 
not be founded on illegally obtained evidence20 was given only 
limited retrospective application.21 In turn, the doctrine that an 
arrested person must be warned in the police station of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent22 was given no retrospective 
application beyond the cases in which the doctrine was announced.23 
These, and cases like them,24 were cases in which newly announced 
doctrines enlarged individual rights. The problem of retroactivity in 
a case like Naked Lunch is complicated by the fact that the new doc-
trine announced in Ginzburg is restrictive of individual freedom, so 
that its retroactive application may have ex post facto overtones. 
17 Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 u.s. 358, 53 Sup. 
Ct. 145, 77 L. Ed. 360 (1932); Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445 (1848). 
18 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 Sup. Ct. 585, 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956). 
19 Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214, 78 Sup. Ct. 1061, 2 L. Ed. 
2d 1269, (1958). 
20 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 Sup. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961). See 
1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§12.2, 12.3, 22.3. 
21 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 Sup. Ct. 1731, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1965). 
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 Sup. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
See §§12.3, 25.3 infra. 
23 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 Sup. Ct. 1772, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966). 
24 See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex reI. Shott, 382 U.s. 460, 86 Sup. Ct. 459, 
15 L. Ed. 2d 453 (1966); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 Sup. Ct. 1229, 14 L. 
Ed. 2d 106 (1965). 
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Finally, in this context, it is noteworthy that the legislature has 
included in its prohibition of distribution of literature to minors not 
only that which is obscene, but also that which is "harmful to minors.25 
This is described as material which appeals predominantly to the 
prurient, shameful, or morbid interest of minors, is patently contrary 
to prevailing standards of adults in the community as to suitable 
material for minors, and is utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance for such minors. The italicized words (not so emphasized in the 
statute) suggest a number of constitutional problems, in addition to 
the general question of legislative power to establish different stan-
dards of obscenity for children and for adults.26 
§1l.3. Justiciability: Judicial abstention. In two cases decided 
during the 1966 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court dealt with 
the question of justiciability of the issues sought to be presented. 
Bane v. Superintendent of Boston State Hospital1 was a mandamus 
proceeding by one who had been involuntarily committed to the 
institution. The petitioner sought an order under which he would be 
permitted to examine and copy the institution's records of his admis-
sion and detention in 1963. The petition was drawn in reliance upon 
a statute2 which provided for judicial orders for inspection and 
copying of such records. A later statute,3 however, provided that a 
patient or his attorney would have no right to examine or copy 
records of a hospital or clinic under the control of the Department of 
Mental Health. The defendant institution was such a hospital. The 
petitioner contended that the latter amendment did not bar his right 
because it was enacted in violation of a Senate Rule forbidding the 
introduction of non-germane matter under color of an amendment to 
a pending bill. The Court refused to go into the merits of the con-
tention, saying: "[T]he statute cannot be thus impugned in a court of 
law."4 
The Court here seemed to have applied the salutary principle that 
one branch of the government must show a decent respect for the 
freedom of a co-ordinate branch to carryon its business. The point is 
well illustrated by Field v. Clark,5 cited by the Court in the Bane case. 
There, an Act of Congress was challenged on the ground, among 
others, that the bill had not received the requisite pluralities of 
affirmative votes in the two Houses. Its passage had been certified, 
25 Acts of 1966, c. 418, amending G.L., c. 272, §28. 
26 The validity of the "variable obscenity" principle in literary censorship was 
sustained in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668 (1966), 
appeal dismissed for want Of a properly presented federal question sub nom.; 
Bookcase, Inc. v. Leary, 385 U.S. 12, 87 Sup. Ct. 81 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 
U.S. 943 (1966). 
§11.3. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 216 N.E.2d Ill. 
2 G.L., c. Ill, §70, as amended by Acts of 1945, c. 291. 
3 Acts of 1964, c. 653. 
4 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 693, 694, 216 N.E.2d Ill, 112. 
5143 U.S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892). 
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however, by the Speaker and the President of the Senate, and the 
United States Supreme Court ruled that these certificates were conclu-
sive, and that it would not be proper judicial action to make an 
independent determination of their accuracy. In the present case, the 
Court seemed to say, in substance, that it is for the Senate, not the 
courts, to make the final determination as to compliance with its rule 
on the admissibility of a bill. 
It should be noted, however, that there are limits to the deference 
which the doctrine of judicial abstention requires to be paid to the co-
ordinate branches. This was exemplified in United States v. Smith,6 
which involved an interpretation by the United States Senate of one 
of its own rules. The Senate determined that, under its rules, it could 
reconsider its approval of an executive nomination and reject the 
nominee, even after it had notified the President of its approval, and 
the President had completed the appointment. In a case brought by 
the Senate to try the appointee's title to the office, the Court ruled that 
it was not bound by the Senate's interpretation of the Senate rule, but 
that it was free to make its own interpretation. This case is distin-
guishable, on several points, from the Bane case, but it is mentioned 
as a caveat against a too-doctrinaire invocation of the doctrine of 
judicial abstention from issues involving legislative procedure. 
The other case holding that the tendered issue was non-justiciable 
was United Kosher Butchers Association v. Associated Synagogues of 
Greater Boston, Inc.7 The corporate plaintiff had been accepted in the 
greater Boston area by most of the kosher meat stores and the gener-
ality of the consuming public desiring to purchase kosher meat and 
poultry, as the authoritative certifier that "all the Kashruth require-
ments have been thoroughly observed." The plaintiff's certifications 
were supervised by a respected rabbi. The defendant corporation, in 
consultation with a group of orthodox rabbis, certified caterers in the 
area as authentic purveyors of kosher food. 
Beginning in 1960, the defendant refused to certify caterers who 
bought kosher meat and poultry from meat stores certified by the 
plaintiff unless the stores would submit to supervision by the defen-
dant's rabbinical committee. In consequence, so it was alleged, many 
caterers withdrew their patronage from stores supervised by the 
plaintiff, and some of the stores withdrew from the plaintiff's super-· 
vision. The plaintiff's bill charged that the defendant's conduct 
constituted an illegal interference with the plaintiff's contractual 
relations. The trial judge sustained a demurrer and, on his subsequent 
report,S the order was affirmed, with directions to dismiss the bill. 
On the premise that civil courts are not competent to resolve issues 
which are basically controversies over ecclesiastical law, the Supreme 
Judicial Court declined to assume jurisdiction. While the plaintiff was 
6286 U.S. 6, 52 Sup. Ct. 475, 76 L. Ed. 954 (1932). 
7349 Mass. 595, 211 N.E.2d 332 (1965), also noted in §4.l0 supra. 
S G.L.. c. 214, §30. 
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faced with the alternatives of preservation or loss of materialistic, 
advantageous economic relations, the "central issue"9 was: Who, under 
Jewish law or practice, has authority to enforce Jewish dietary laws, 
to determine whether foods are kosher, and to determine the pro-
cedures for administration of the dietary laws? The plaintiff and the 
defendant each claimed such authority, independent of the other. 
These conflicting claims, the Court felt, may be resolved only by 
Jewish law, and such resolution must be made, if at all, elsewhere than 
in the civil court. 
This decision, of course, carries constitutional overtones, but it is 
not based, at least expressly, upon constitutional imitations. The 
situation here was quite different from that in KedrofJ v. St. Nicholas 
Cathedral,lO which invalidated a statute transferring jurisdiction of 
New York property of the Russian Orthodox Church from the 
Patriarch in Moscow to an Archbishop chosen by the Church's 
American hierarchy. This was held to be a violation of the First 
Amendment's emanation in the Fourteenth. The New York Court of 
Appeals, however, did not feel that this posed a barrier to arrival at 
the same result by judicial decree.ll The constitutional point remains 
open, since the United States Supreme Court denied a motion for 
leave to file a mandamus petition to compel the Court of Appeals to 
obey the Supreme Court's mandate in KedrofJ.12 
The decision in the present case does not necessarily mean that the 
civil courts in Massachusetts must eschew decision in all cases which 
involve resolution of issues of ecclesiastical law or custom. The 
Supreme Judicial Court has not hesitated to perform its function of 
determining the applicability of a statute13 or of a written instrument, 
such as a Will,14 in which the relevant criterion of applicability is the 
status of an individual as a member of a religious body, a matter 
determined by church law or custom. 
§11.4. Interstate commerce: State regulation. The Supreme Judi-
cial Court was divided in a case involving the question of the scope of 
state power to regulate interstate commerce. Commonwealth v. New 
York Central Railroad CO.1 arose under the statute2 which makes it 
unlawful for a railroad train to obstruct a public way for more than 
five minutes at one time. 
The railroad had, at its classification yard in Framingham, Massa-
9349 Mass. 595, 599, 211 N.E. 2d 332, 334 (1965). 
10344 U.S. 94, 73 Sup. Ct. 143, 97 L. Ed. 120 (1952). 
11 St. Nicholas Cathedral v. Kedroff, 306 N.Y. 38, 114 N.E.2d 197 (1953). 
il2 Ex Parte Kedroff, 346 U.S. 893, 74 Sup. Ct. 237, 98 L. Ed. 396 (1953). 
13 Goldman, Petitioner, 331 Mass. 647, 121 N.E.2d 843 (1954), cert. denied sub 
nom., Goldman v. Fogarty, 348 U.S. 942, 75 Sup. Ct. 363, 99 L. Ed. 737 (1955) (reli-
gious status of an adopted infant). 
14 Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 236 (1955), cert. denied, 349 
U.S. 947, 75 Sup. Ct. 875, 99 L. Ed. 1273 (1955) ("born in the Hebrew faith"). 
§11.4. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 805, 216 N.E.2d 870. 
2 G.L., c. 160, §151. 
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chusetts, freight cars shipped in over its lines from Detroit and Flint, 
Michigan, and its practice was to move these cars, in trains of from five 
to fifty cars, from the classification yard to its own unloading yard or 
to the General Motors assembly plant, both in Framingham. The cars 
contained automobiles, some of which were consigned to the General 
Motors plant, the others to automobile dealers in the northeastern 
part of the United States. The train in the present case consisted of 33 
cars, and it took seven minutes to cross a public way in Framingham. 
It was made to appear that reduction of the maximum train size to 15 
or 20 cars (which, inferentially, would involve obstruction of public 
ways for less than five minutes) would result in "a much more ineffi-
cient and costlier operation."3 It was further made to appear that the 
present case was one of some 30 in which the railroad was charged 
with unlawful obstruction of the public ways in Framingham. 
The first question considered by the Court was one of statutory 
interpretation, viz., whether the statute covered obstructions by 
moving trains, or only obstructions by standing trains. The majority 
ruled that obstruction by the defendant's moving train came within 
the meaning of the statute, and then went on to sustain the statute, so 
construed, as constitutionally valid. Justices Spalding and Cutter 
would interpret the statute as applicable only to obstructions caused 
by standing trains, as they felt that the interpretation of the majority 
would leave the statute unconstitutional as applied to obstructions 
caused by trains moving in interstate commerce, as, concededly, the 
defendant's trains were. 
The division in the Court was focused upon a difference in the 
interpretation of Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,4 in which the 
Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a state train-length-
limit law on the ground that it constituted an undue burden on 
interstate commerce. The majority distinguished Southern Pacific on 
the ground that the record there showed that the Arizona law operated 
to disrupt railroad operations all the way from Los Angeles to El Paso, 
whereas here the only impact of the statute upon the makeup of trains 
was strictly local. The minority argued that Southern Pacific governed, 
because the statute, as interpreted by the majority, would be as appli-
cable to trains actually crossing state lines as to the local switching 
operation here involved. Further, the increased operational expense 
occasioned by application of the law is itself an unwarranted burden 
upon commerce. 
The problem here is basically one which has been vexing judges for 
over a century. In Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia,5 the Su-
preme Court "solved" the problem that had been posed from the time 
Daniel Webster raised it in argument in Gibbons v. Ogden:6 Does the 
31966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 805, 807, 216 N.E.2d 870, 87l. 
4325 u.s. 761, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945). 
5 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (U.S. 1851). 
69 Wheat. I, 6 L. Ed. 23 (U.S. 1824). 
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Commerce Clause,7 of its own force, Congress not having spoken, de-
prive the states of power to regulate commerce among the several states? 
The Cooley response was: It all depends. Subjects of the commerce 
power which are national in nature, or which require uniform regu-
lation, may be controlled by Congress alone, but matters of local 
concern are subject to state action until Congress intervenes. 
This appealing apothegm has provided minimal assistance in the 
solution of concrete problems of regulation in a highly industrialized, 
complex society. The slow-down-trains-at-grade-crossing laws provide 
an illustration. In Southern Railway Co. v. King,S it was argued that 
such a law, as applied to a train moving in interstate commerce within 
the state, was unconstitutional on its face. The contention was re-
jected because the United States Supreme Court was not persuaded 
that the law was not an appropriate police regulation, imposed in the 
interest of public safety. Some time afterwards, however, the identical 
law was held invalid when it was made to appear on the record that 
there were 124 grade crossings along 123 miles of railroad line, and 
that compliance with the law by the railroad's interstate trains would 
require a train to take ten and one-half hours for a run scheduled for 
four hours and thirty minutes.9 
It is hardly practicable to decide in a vacuum whether a given law, 
in its operation, is essentially a local police regulation or a regulation 
of a subject national in scope. Ideally, when the issue comes up, there 
should be a fully developed factual record, bringing out, in a realistic 
way, the impacts the law in question actually has, both by burden upon 
those engaged in commerce, and by way of promotion of interests of 
genuinely local concern. This, of course, does not guarantee an un-
challengeable resolution of the issue; the dissents in Southern Pacific 
indicate that differences of result are to be anticipated even when all 
facts are before the courts, since the record in that case completely 
detailed the background and the practical operation of the law. The 
advantage of such a record, however, is that it affords a basis for the 
best considered judgment as to how the challenged law fits into the 
constitutional scheme of federalism. It is regrettable that the Supreme 
Judicial Court did not have the benefit of this type of record in the 
present case. 
§1l.5. Miscellaneous decisions. The dogma of non-delegability of 
legislative power has undergone further erosion. A year ago it was 
noted in these pages1 that the Supreme Judicial Court had given a 
sophisticated reaction to a contention, based upon the traditional 
doctrinaire formula, delegata potestas non potest delegari, that a grant 
of broad discretionary powers to the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
7 U.S. Canst. Art. I, §3, d. 3. 
S 217 U.S. 524, 30 Sup. Ct. 594, 54 L. Ed. 868 (1910). 
9 Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310, 37 Sup. Ct. 640, 61 L. 
Ed. 1160, L.R.A. 1917F 1184 (1917). 
§11.5. 11965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.11. 
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Authority was invalid. The Court realistically ruled that the Authority 
was properly given power adequate to the performance of the legiti-
mate function of developing and maintaining a system of mass trans-
portation, particularly when the enabling legislation provided safe-
guards against gross abuse of the granted power.2 During the 1966 
SURVEY year, the Court summarily dismissed another contention that 
legislative power had been unlawfully delegated. 
It is settled Massachusetts law that land held for park purposes 
may be diverted to other purposes only by legislative permission.a 
The Boston Board of Park Commissioners had statutory4 control of 
land in the Chestnut Hill Reservoir area held by the City of Boston 
for park purposes. A later statute5 authorized the Board to convey to 
the Metropolitan District Commission as much of this land as the city 
and the Commission might agree to be needed for "recreational" pur-
poses. (It was proposed that the Commission erect an athletic plant 
for such events as high school track meets. It was assumed that such 
use of the land would not be for "park purposes"). The Park Board 
conveyed a parcel of land to the Commission, and a subsequent statute6 
authorized construction of the athletic facility. In a taxpayers' suit7 to 
enjoin use of the land for this purpose, the Court tersely rejected the 
argument that there was an improper delegation of the power to divert 
land from park to other uses.s It was reasonably clear, argued the 
Court, that the Legislature had concluded that some of the "park" 
land could be spared for the "recreational" use, and H[T]he only au-
thority delegated was the right to determine how much of that plot 
was actually necessary for the development of a center reasonably de-
scribed in St. 1964, c. 441."9 
An interesting question of federalism was, at least tangentially, 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
Moran v. Bench.10 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that, 
for reasons of public policy, federal civil servants are not liable in 
damages for common law torts committed by them while acting within 
the scope of their official duties.11 It is not clear to what extent, if at 
all, Massachusetts law accords such privilege to state employees.12 It 
2 Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co., 348 Maas. 538, 205 N.E.2d 346 (1965), noted in 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§11.lI. 
a Jacobson v. Parks & Recreation Commission of Boston, 345 Mass. 641, 189 
N.E.2d 199 (1963); Loomis v. City of Boston, 331 Mass. 129, 117 N.E.2d 539 (1954). 
4 Acts of 1899, c. 274, §I. 
5 Acts of 1959, c. 240. 
6 Acts of 1964, c. 441. 
7 As authorized by G.L., c. 29, §63. 
S Everett v. Metropolitan District Commission, 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 615, 215 
N.E.2d 763. 
9Id. at 618, 215 N.E.2d at 766. 
10353 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1965). 
11 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 79 Sup. Ct. 1335,3 L. Ed. 2d 1454 (1959); Howard 
v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 79 Sup. Ct. 1335, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1434 (1959). 
12 Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). But see DiMaggio v. 
12
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1966 [1966], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1966/iss1/14
§1l.5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 155 
is, however, clear that state employees acting by virtue or under color 
of state law are liable in damages for statutory torts committed in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act.13 The plaintiff in the Moran case 
complained that the defendants, officials in the state Registry of Motor 
Vehicles, had improperly procured, first the suspension, and secondly 
the withholding of restoration of her motor vehicle operator's license. 
In opposition to a defense motion for summary judgment, the plain-
tiff set forth by affidavit that the defendants had "conspired" against 
her. The Court was of the opinion that this recital of a conclusion, 
without setting forth facts which would legally establish the existence 
of a conspiracy such as the statute condemned, was not an adequate 
way of charging invasion of a federal right. This is probably a sound 
decision, even on liberal standards of pleading, but is especially ap-
propriate in a case such as the one before the Court, where the invoca-
tion of federal law in a field ordinarily covered by state law should be 
subjected to close scrutiny.14 
The Supreme Judicial Court seemingly checkmated a political ploy 
in Commissioner of Administration v. Kelley.15 The Reorganization 
Act of 1962,16 which became effective on January 3, 1963, abolished 
the Commission on Administration and Finance, and created in its 
stead the Executive Office for Administration and Finance. Prior to 
the effective date of the Act, Kelley had been Director of Personnel 
and Standardization in the Commission.17 The Reorganization Act 
created the office of Director of Personnel and Standardization in the 
Executive Office for Administration and Finance,18 The Director was 
to be appointed by the Commissioner, and was to be removable only 
for cause,19 The Supplemental Appropriation Act of 196320 provided 
that the person who was the incumbent Director of Personnel and 
Standardization on January 2, 1963, was to be deemed to have been 
transferred to the new Bureau of Personnel and was to continue in 
office until removed for cause. Kelley continued to perform the func-
tions of the Director and to receive the salary for that office. The 
Commissioner desired to appoint another person as director but, since 
Kelley asserted that there was no vacancy in the office, the Commis-
sioner brought suit against him for a declaratory judgment. Kelley 
Mystic Building Wrecking Co., 340 Mass. 686, 690, 166 N.E.2d 213, 217 (1960); Sul-
livan v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 619, 628, 142 N.E.2d 347, 353 (1957). 
1342 U.S.C. §§1983, 1985 (1964). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 Sup. Ct. 
473, 5 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1961). 
14 Compare Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 Sup. Ct. 119, 75 L. Ed. 291 
(1931), with Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 54 Sup. Ct. 603, 78 L. Ed. 1077 
(1934). 
15350 Mass. 501, 215 N.E. 2d 653 (1966). 
16 Acts of 1952, c. 757, amending several sections of C.L., c. 7. 
17 C.L., c. 7, §5, as it stood prior to Acts of 1962, c. 757. 
18 C.L., c. 7, §4B, as amended by Acts of 1962, c. 757. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Acts of 1963, c. 837, 2, Item 0441·10. 
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demurred to the bill, and the case was reported to the full bench on 
bill and demurrer. 
One ground of demurrer was that there was no actual controversy 
between the parties. The Court pointed out, however, that the bill 
tendered the issue of the constitutionality of the Appropriation Act 
in the light of the separation-of-powers provision21 that, "the legisla-
tive department shall never exercise the executive ... powers," and 
concluded that this constituted a present controversy over Kelley's 
title to the office. Because the case was up on demurrer, the Court 
abstained from going to the merits and deciding whether the Appro-
priation Act purported to "appoint" Kelley to the office and thus 
usurped a function of the executive department. The reader of the 
opinion, however, gets the distinct impression that, if the merits had 
been reached, they would have been resolved in favor of the plaintiff. 
A year ago, the statute22 providing for summary suspension of state 
employees who are indicted for action constituting misconduct in 
office was construed to supersede the procedural provisions on sus-
pensions and removals23 contained in the civil service laws.24 In 
Reynolds v. Commissioner of Commerce and Deveiopment25 an em-
ployee summarily suspended upon his indictment for larceny sought 
reinstatement (even though he had been convicted under the indict-
ment) on the ground that the statute, as applied to him, was a law 
impairing the obligation of contract.26 He was a veteran with three 
years in the service of the Commonwealth, and would thus normally 
be entitled to notice, agency hearing, review by the Civil Service Com-
mission, and judicial review as conditions of termination of his em-
ployment.27 The Court, however, assuming, arguendo, that these 
procedural rights were contractual in nature, pointed out that con-
tractual rights are always subject to be frustrated by proper exercise 
of the police power. It went on to rule that the Legislature, even 
after the making of the "contract," could properly avoid "the inap-
propriate situation of having an official under indictment engaged in 
the duties of his office."28 
Another civil service case, Luacaw v. Fire Commissioner of Boston,29 
presented a rather fine-spun theory of invasion of a constitutional 
right. After a hearing, notice of which was afterwards found to be 
defective in that it did not specify the disciplinary action contem-
plated,so the Fire Commissioner discharged one of his fire-fighters. 
21 Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, Art. XXX. 
22 G.L., c. 30, §59. 
2S G.L., c. 31, §§43, 45. 
24 Bessette v. Commissioner of Public Works, 348 Mass. 605, 204 N.E.2d 909 
(1965). 
251966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 214 N.E.2d 69. 
26 U.S. Const. Art. I, §1O. 
27 G.L., c. 30, §9A which refers to G.L., c. 31, §§43, 45. 
281966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 167, 168, 214 N.E.2d 69, 71. 
29350 Mass. 326, 214 N.E.2d 734 (1966). 
so As required by G.L., c. 31, §43. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1966 [1966], Art. 14
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1966/iss1/14
§11.5 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 157 
The latter applied for a hearing de novo before the Civil Service 
Commission.31 He did not, within the allotted time, file a complaint 
with the Commission under G.L., c. 31, §46A, alleging that the Fire 
Commissioner had failed to follow the statutory removal procedure. 
When the Civil Service Commission set the matter down for a hearing 
on the merits, the firefighter first obtained a continuance, and then 
declined to participate in the hearing, notifying the Commission that 
he proposed to proceed in the courts by mandamus. The Commission 
proceeded with the hearing. It is settled law that mandamus is an 
alternative remedy to a complaint under General Laws, Chapter 31, 
Section 46A, for vacating discharges on the ground of failure to follow 
statutory procedures.32 It is also settled, however, that invocation of 
the right to hearing on the merits before the Civil Service Commission 
under General Laws, Chapter 31, Section 43, constitutes a waiver of the 
right to bring mandamus.33 In consequence, the firefighter's petition 
for mandamus was dismissed. He appealed, contending that he had 
been denied due process of law. Without pausing to consider to what 
extent a firefighter is constitutionally entitled to the benefit of removal 
procedures, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contention, point-
ing out that the employee had had in fact an opportunity to be heard. 
This, of course, adequately answers the due process contention, even 
though the employee, perhaps inadvertently, waived his opportunity. 
A unique constitutional theory was presented by the respondents 
in Town of Swampscott v. Remis.34 In 1961 the town meeting voted to 
take certain land by eminent domain under General Laws, Chapter 
80A. The board of selectment in 1964 adopted an order of intention 
to take,35 and subsequently, pursuant to the statute,36 filed in the 
Superior Court a petition to establish its right to take the land and 
to determine damages. The land owner, who remained in possession, 
opposed the petition on the ground that the statute, by failing to re-
quire payment of interest upon the award from the time of the order 
of intention to take to the time of entry of judgment of condemnation, 
did not provide just compensation. It was argued that the pendency 
of the condemnation proceeding made the property unmarketable and 
effectively prevented the making of profitable improvements, and 
that, therefore, compensation for these privations, at least in the form 
of interest upon the amount awarded, is constitutionally required.37 
It is well settled that the constitutional concept of just compensa-
tion is that the property owner is entitled to payment at the time his 
31 Ibid. 
32 Chartrand v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 347 Mass. 470, 198 N.E.2d 425 (1964). 
33 Beaumont v. Director of Hospitals, 338 Mass. 25, 153 N.E.2d 656 (1958). Some-
what anomalously, by the express provisions of G.L., c. 31, §46A, an application 
for hearing on the merits under Section 43 may be filed together with a complaint 
under Section 46A. 
34 350 Mass. 523, 215 N.E.2d 777 (1966). 
35 Pursuant to G.L., c. 80A §2. 
36Id. §4. 
37 Mass. Const. Declaration of Rights, Art. X; U.S. Const. Amend. Arts. V, XIV. 
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property is actually taken, and if he is not, in fact, paid until a later 
date, he is entitled to interest for the interval.a8 But, until the public 
body takes possession or acquires title, the constitutions do not require 
the payment of compensation to the owner.a9 In the language of Chief 
Justice Rugg: "The mere paper taking of land gives no right to dam-
ages."40 In the present case, the Court ruled that the asserted right 
to interest was unfounded. The owner is not considered entitled to 
compensation while he retains his ownership and possession. While the 
imminence of a taking limits the value of his rights, "[c]hanges in value 
due to these causes are no more than incidents of ownership in a 
jurisdiction such as ours where all land is subject to the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain."41 
38 "The true rule would be, as in the case of other purchases, that the price is 
due and ought to be paid, at the moment the purchase is made, when credit is 
not specially agreed upon. And if a pie· powder court could be called on the 
instant and on the spot, the true rule of justice for the public would be, to pay 
the compensation with one hand, whilst they apply the axe with the other; and 
this rule is departed from only because some time is necessary, by the forms of 
law, to conduct the inquiry, and this delay must be compensated by interest." 
Shaw, C-J., in Parks v. Boston, 15 Pick. 198, 208 (Mass. 1834). And see United 
States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 55 Sup. Ct. 681, 79 L. Ed. 1331 (1935). 
39 Connor v. Metropolitan District Water Supply Commission 314 Mass. 33, 49 
N.E.2d 593 (1943). 
40 Mayor & Aldermen of Taunton, Petititoners, 290 Mass. 118, 121, 194 N.E. 919, 
920 (1935). 
411966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 557, 560, 215 N.E.2d 777, 779. 
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